Applying Criticisms of the Warren Court to the Burger Court: A Case Study of Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia by Switzer, Erwin O.
University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review 
Volume 5 Issue 2 Article 1 
1982 
Applying Criticisms of the Warren Court to the Burger Court: A 
Case Study of Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia 
Erwin O. Switzer 
Follow this and additional works at: https://lawrepository.ualr.edu/lawreview 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Supreme Court of the United States Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Erwin O. Switzer, Applying Criticisms of the Warren Court to the Burger Court: A Case Study of Richmond 
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 5 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 203 (1982). 
Available at: https://lawrepository.ualr.edu/lawreview/vol5/iss2/1 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Bowen Law Repository: Scholarship & Archives. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review by an authorized editor of Bowen 
Law Repository: Scholarship & Archives. For more information, please contact mmserfass@ualr.edu. 
UNIVERSITY OF ARKANSAS AT LITTLE ROCK
LAW JOURNAL
VOLUME 5 1982 NUMBER 2
APPLYING CRITICISMS OF THE WARREN COURT TO
THE BURGER COURT: A CASE STUDY OF
RICHMOND NEWSPAPERS, INC v. VIRGINIA
Erwin 0. Switzer*
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court while under the leadership
of Chief Justice Earl Warren rendered decisions that had a
profound effect on American society. Several series of cases in the
areas of desegregation,1 reapportionment,2 and criminal procedure
3
forced changes in many state practices. The Warren Court also
gave greater recognition to privacy4 and free expression 5 interests.
While it invalidated state practices,6 the Warren Court upheld fed-
eral laws which reached into areas traditionally outside the scope of
federal authority, such as statutes outlawing certain types of private
* Clerk for the Honorable Floyd R. Gibson, United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit; A.B., St. Louis University, 1978; J.D., St. Louis University, 1981. The opin-
ions expressed herein are solely those of the author.
1. E.g., Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968); Griffin v. County School
Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. E.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963);
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
3. E.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
4. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
5. E.g., Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254 (1964); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
6. All of the cases cited in notes 1 through 5 arose from state actions.
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discrimination.7 Legal scholars were mixed in their views about
how much benefit the decisions rendered to society." Even among
scholars who claimed to be sympathetic to the result achieved by the
Court, however, there was criticism of the methodology. 9
Between 1969 and 1980, five of the Warren Court Justices were
replaced. Four of the appointments were made by President
Nixon,'" who promised to appoint strict constructionists." Presi-
dent Ford made one appointment.' 2 This article will review the crit-
icisms of the Warren Court and use one of the major 1980 cases of
the Burger Court, Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,13 to ex-
plore the extent to which the Nixon-Ford appointees have changed
or continued the decisionmaking practices which provoked Warren
Court critics. An opinion written by Chief Justice Warren Burger is
especially appropriate for comparison, because of his importance as
the Chief Justice and as the first Nixon appointee.
7. The Court upheld title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibited discrimi-
nation in public accommodations because of the effect of discrimination on interstate com-
merce. Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United
States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
8. For example, Herbert Wechsler felt that the desegregation cases would make a great
contribution to society. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73
HARV. L. REV. 1, 27 (1959). Alexander Bickel on the other hand, felt that Brown v. Board of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), was headed for "irrelevance." A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT
AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 151 (1978).
9. Wechsler, for instance, praised the result in the integration cases, supra note 8, but
felt that Warren Court decisions in the area of obscenity, the commerce power, freedom of
speech, and especially integration were not based on principles that transcended the imme-
diate result. Wechsler, supra note 8, at 19-35. Philip Kurland said of Court decisions up-
holding congressional statutes which outlawed both public and private discrimination,
"That this is desirable ought not to be doubted. That it is legitimate is not so easily estab-
lished." P. KURLAND, POLITICS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE WARREN COURT 155 (1970)
[hereinafter P. KURLAND, POLITICS]. In 1964 Kurland stated, "Measuring the desirability of
the results decreed, most students of the Court---even the 'nonactivists'-are inclined to ap-
probation." Kurland, Forward- "Equal in Origin and Equal in Title to the Legislative and
Executive Branches of the Government," 78 HARV. L. REV. 143, 143 (1964) (footnote omitted)
[hereinafter Kurland, Equal in Origin].
Judge Skelly Wright, on the other hand, argued that methodology cannot be simply
removed from the result. He instead advocated decisionmaking analogous to the evolution
of common law, where the result is considered and principles develop from a series of cases.
Wright, Professor Bickel, the Scholarly Tradition, and the Supreme Court, 84 HARV. L. Rav.
769, 778-79 (1971).
10. Chief Justice Burger (1969), Justices Blackmun (1970), Powell (1972), and Rehn-
quist (1972).
11. F. Graham, Crucial Choice for Nixon: .4 New Chief Justice, N.Y. Times, May 4,
1979, § 4, at 7, col. 1.
12. Justice Stevens in 1975.
13. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
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II. CRITICISMS OF THE WARREN COURT
Warren Court decisions were criticized by scholars for being
unprincipled and nonjudicial. Among the leading critics of the
Warren Court were Philip Kurland, 14 Alexander Bickel, 5 and Her-
bert Wechsler. 6 Some of the criticisms were objective, making
existence of the objects of the criticism easy to discern. The harshest
criticism, however, was reserved for a more subjective characteris-
tic-result-oriented, unprincipled decisions.17
Among the objective criticisms were two that charged the Court
was behaving like a legislature. Kurland, the leading critic on these
points, noted the heavy use of amicus curiae briefs. 8 Kurland lik-
ened the use of such briefs to a lobbying effort. He pointed out that
the Court even requested amicus briefs from the Solicitor General. 19
Both Kurland and Bickel compared the Court to a legislature
because of its tendency to make decisions which were not retroac-
tive.20  Especially in the criminal procedure area, the Court over-
ruled prior cases but did not apply the new constitutional principle
to individuals convicted under the old rules.21 Bickel was especially
disturbed by cases in which the petitioner would have a new rule
applied to him while petitioners in dozens of other indistinguishable
cases pending before the Supreme Court were treated under the old
rule of law.22 In such cases, one of which was Miranda v. Arizona,23
Bickel said, "[Tihe injustice is plain. ' '24 Kurland tempered his criti-
14. P. KURLAND, POLITICS, supra note 9; Kurland, Equal in Origin, supra note 9. Kur-
land concluded his foreword for the Harvard Law Review article on the 1963 term with this
acerbic description of what is fair criticism of the Warren Court:
It behooves any critic of the Court's performance to close on a note reminiscent of
the wall plaque of frontier times: "Don't shoot the piano player. He's doing his
best." It is still possible, however, to wish that he would stick to the piano and not
try to be a one-man band. It is too much to ask that he take piano lessons.
Kurland, Equal in Origin, supra note 9, at 176.
15. A. BICKEL, supra note 8.
16. Weschler, supra note 8.
17. But see Wright, supra note 9, who argues that result-oriented judicial decisionmak-
ing should not necessarily be criticized.
18. P. KURLAND, POLITICS, supra note 9, at 191-92.
19. Id
20. Id at 187-90; A. BICKEL, supra note 8, at 54-58.
21. P. KURLAND, POLITICS, supra note 9, at 190.
22. A. BICKEL, supra note 8, at 56.
23. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
24. A. BICKEL, supra note 8, at 56. One could say the injustice is just as plain when
common-law courts engage in the same practice, as they usually do. If one accepts Judge
Wright's view of constitutional adjudication as being analogous to common-law adjudica-
tion, supra note 9, the application of decisions without retroactivity should be expected.
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cism of both the use of amicus briefs and nonretroactive decisions
by purporting to be nonjudgmental about the wisdom of the prac-
tices.25 However, he did list the problems created by a Court that
joins the executive and legislative branches in making national
policy.
26
The scholars also charged that the Warren Court misused his-
tory. Bickel accused the Court of "[w]illful simplification of his-
tory."2z7  Although he stopped short of calling the Court's use of
history "almost surely wrong, 2z8 Bickel thought the Court oversim-
plified history when it found historical support for a reading of the
fourteenth amendment which upheld a special provision of the Vot-
ing Rights Act 29 and a reading of the thirteenth amendment which
upheld Congress' power to outlaw private racial discrimination in
real estate.30 (Indeed, Bickel questioned whether history supported
the Court's interpretation of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 as in-
tending to prohibit such discrimination). 3' Bickel also criticized the
Court for aiming to "prov[e] the unprovable" in its attempt to justify
Miranda on the basis that the Court was merely applying long-rec-
ognized principles. 32 Kurland thought that the Justices, in support-
ing their opinions on racial cases, found a greater egalitarian history
in the United States than actually existed.
Another of Bickel's criticisms was that majority opinion writers
would fail even to address important points raised in dissenting
opinions.33
Kurland criticized the Warren Court for its contribution to the
Bickel could argue that constitutional adjudication should not be handled this way for juris-
prudential reasons, but he should not have relied simply on the fact that the result is unjust.
Paul Mishkin noted that the reason full retroactivity of decisions was the rule before the
days of the Warren Court was probably that the Justices believed it "obvious" that whatever
the Court holds to be the law of the Constitution becomes "what always has been the law."
Mishkin, Foreword- The High Court, The Great Writ, and the Due Process of Time and Law,
79 HARV. L. REV. 56, 57 (1965). Kurland has also noted the distinction between the com-
mon-law judicial legislation and constitutional adjudication. P. KURLAND, POLITICS, supra
note 9, at 177.
25. P. KURLAND, POLITICS, supra note 9, at 190, 192.
26. id at 195-204.
27. A. BICKEL, supra note 8, at 47.
28. Id at 49.
29. In Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), the Court, according to Bickel, held
that section 5 of the fourteenth amendment enables Congress to supplement, rather than
merely implement, the guarantees of that amendment. A. BICKEL, supra note 8, at 48.
30. A. BICKEL, supra note 8, at 49 (citing Jones v. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968)).
31. Id
32. Id at 49-50.
33. Id at 73-75.
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decline of federalism.34 He thought the Court had gone further than
any post-Marshall Court in this matter 31 with its decisions in labor
law, 36 federal jurisdiction and choice of law, 37 defamation,38 the
commerce power,39 racial discrimination, 40  and criminal
procedure.'
Bickel, Kurland, and Wechsler also condemned the use of per
curiam opinions in areas of unsettled law. The Court was most
faulted for this practice in the obscenity and desegregation cases. In
the obscenity area, the Court failed to establish standards for movie
censorship by simply reversing per curiam five decisions which had
upheld film censorship.42 They were the first cases to arise after the
Court decided movies were protected by the first amendment.43
Wechsler questioned whether such unexplained decisions were at all
defensible.' There was also criticism of the per curiam orders
which followed Brown v. Board of Education.45 The Court in Brown
prohibited state-segregated schools, relying in part on the impor-
tance of the educational process. 46 The Court in the next few years
extended-by per curiam decisions-the rule of Brown to public
transportation, parks, golf courses, bath houses, and beaches.47
Wechsler thought these orders deserved principled decisions.48
34. P. KURLAND, POLITICS, supra note 9, at ch. 3.
35. Id at 59-60.
36. Id at 60-61.
37. Id at 61-63.
38. Id at 63-64.
39. Id at 64-66.
40. Id at 69-73.
41. Id at 73-83.
42. Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 355 U.S. 35 (1957), rev'gper curiam, 244 F.2d
432 (7th Cir. 1957); Holmby Prod., Inc. v. Vaughn, 350 U.S. 870 (1955), rev'gper curiam, 177
Kan. 728, 282 P.2d 412 (1955); Superior Films, Inc. v. Department of Educ., 346 U.S. 587
(1954), rev'gper curiam, 159 Ohio St. 315, 112 N.E.2d 311 (1953); Superior Films, Inc. v.
Department of Educ., 346 U.S. 587 (1954), rev'gper curiam, Commercial Pictures Corp. v.
Board of Regents, 305 N.Y. 336, 113 N.E.2d 502 (1953); Gelling v. Texas, 343 U.S. 960
(1952), rev'gper curiam, 157 Tex. Crim. 516, 247 S.W.2d 95 (1952).
43. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
44. Wechsler, supra note 8, at 21.
45. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
4.6. Id at 493-94.
47. New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass'n v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958), af'gper
curiam, 252 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1958); Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956), aff'gper
curiam, 142 F. Supp. 707 (M.D. Ala. 1956); Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955),
rev'gper curiam, 223 F.2d 93 (5th Cir. 1955); Mayor of Baltimore City v. Dawson, 350 U.S.
877 (1955), aff'gper curiam, 220 F.2d 386 (4th Cir. 1955); Muir v. Louisville Park Theatrical
Ass'n, 347 U.S. 971 (1954), rev'gper curiam, 202 F.2d 275 (6th Cir. 1953).
48. Wechsler, supra note 8, at 22.
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Kurland said the Court in these cases "took the easy way out. 4 9
Bickel said of the per curiam orders: "[They] fail to build the bridge
between the authorities they cite and the results they decree."5
In addition to these objective criticisms, the scholars attacked
Warren Court decisions as unprincipled. Decisions were criticized
for not having a sound basis in the Constitution,5' lacking preceden-
tial authority,52 (going so far as to overrule even the Warren Court's
own decisions),53 and failing to develop principles useful for future
decisions. 4
Before applying the Warren Court criticisms to Richmond
Newspapers, the facts and opinions in that case should be
summarized.
III. RICHMOND NEWSPAPERS, INC. v. VIRGINIA
In Richmond Newspapers the Court faced the issue of whether
there is a right under the first amendment for the press and public to
attend criminal trials. The Court found that such a right presump-
tively exists.
The case arose from a murder trial in Virginia. The defendant
was about to begin his fourth trial on a second-degree murder
charge.55 Before the trial began, the defendant moved that it be
closed to the public. He feared that jurors would get improper in-
formation, such as testimony from prior trials, from persons in at-
tendance or the media. The trial court closed the courtroom to the
press and public. Although two reporters for Richmond Newspa-
pers were in the courtroom when the closure was ordered, they
made no objection. Later in the day Richmond Newspapers sought
a hearing on a motion to vacate the closure order, and the hearing
was held at the end of the day's trial proceedings.
49. P. KURLAND, POLITICS, supra note 9, at 124.
50. Bickel & Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process: The Lincoln Mills
Case, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1, 3 (1957).
51. P. KURLAND, POLITICS, supra note 9, at 91-92, 179-82; see also text accompanying
notes 28-30, supra.
52. A. BICKEL, supra note 8, at 54; P. KURLAND, POLITICS, supra note 9, at xxii, 90-91,
106-07.
53. P. KURLAND, POLITICS, supra note 9, at 186-87.
54. Wechsler, supra note 8, at 24-35; A. BICKEL, supra note 8, at 50, 60-61, 86-87; P.
KURLAND, POLITICS, supra note 9, at 91, 182-83.
55. A conviction in the first trial was reversed by the Virginia Supreme Court because
of improperly admitted evidence. The second trial ended in a mistrial when a juror asked to
be excused after the trial had begun and no alternate was available. A third trial also ended
in a mistrial, apparently because a prospective juror had read about the defendant's case in a
newspaper and told other jurors about the case. 448 U.S. at 559.
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According to the transcript of the hearing, the trial court agreed
with the defense counsel that the open trial would infringe the rights
of the defendant. The prosecutor made no objection to the closure.
No express findings were made by the trial court when it denied the
motion to vacate the closure order.5 6
After the trial, Richmond Newspapers appealed the closure or-
der to the Virginia Supreme Court. That court denied the petition
for appeal. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to
Richmond Newspapers' petition.
The eight Justices who heard the case57 produced seven opin-
ions. Seven Justices voted to reverse the Virginia Supreme Court;
Justice Rehnquist was the lone dissenter. Chief Justice Burger
wrote the opinion of the Court, but was joined by only two Justices,
Justices White and Stevens, both of whom filed concurring opinions.
Justices Brennan, Stewart, and Blackmun each filed opinions which
concurred only in the judgment, with Justice Marshall joining Bren-
nan. The seven to one vote breaks down to a 3-2-1-1 to 1 vote. The
concurrences of Justices White and Stevens, who joined Burger's
opinion, make the result even more divided than those numbers
make it appear. The opinions reflect some agreement, but a brief
summary of the distinctions between the opinions is appropriate.
Burger held that there is an implicit first amendment right to
attend criminal trials which can be denied only when there is an
overriding interest articulated in findings. The opinion leaves un-
clear what "overriding" means.58 Burger distinguished a 1979 case,
Gannett Co. v. DePasquale,59 which had rejected a publisher's claim
of a sixth amendment right to attend a pretrial hearing. Gannett had
not addressed the issue of whether there is a first amendment right6°
of' access to trials. Burger distinguished Gannett on the basis that
Gannett dealt with a pretrial hearing and was a sixth amendment
case. Burger's first amendment analysis emphasized a history of ac-
cess to criminal trials and analogized a courtroom to traditional
public forums (like streets and parks).
56. Id at 559-61. On the first day of the trial the court struck the state's evidence,
sustained the defendant's motion for a mistrial, and declared the defendant not guilty. Id at
561-62.
57. Justice Powell did not participate.
58. An "overriding interest" might be read as requiring a strong interest, but it also
could be read as merely describing any interest which happens to outweigh another. See
text accompanying notes 87-88 nfira.
59. 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
60. The Court in Gannett assumed arguendo that a first amendment right existed be-
cause regardless of the scope of the right, it was overridden in that case. Id at 392-93.
1982]
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In White's concurrence to Burger's opinion, the Justice
bemoaned the fact that Richmond Newspapers was necessary. He
thought that Gannett had been wrongly decided on the sixth amend-
ment issue, but given the result in that case, he agreed with Burger's
first amendment analysis.6 Stevens, who, like White, joined Bur-
ger's opinion, thought that the first amendment analysis was correct
because it followed the thrust of Stevens' argument in dissent in
Houchins v. KQED, Inc. 62 Stevens said that Richmond Newspapers
stands for the proposition that the government cannot arbitrarily in-
terfere with "access to important information."63 Burger had writ-
ten the Court opinion in Houchins (for a three-Justice plurality on a
seven-Justice Court with Stewart concurring in the judgment) in
which he refused to grant the press and public a constitutional right
of access to a prison. Stevens found Gannett distinguishable.
64
Brennan concurred only in the judgment. He wrote an opinion
which contained his own first amendment analysis, and concluded
that the first amendment granted the public a right of access to tri-
als. Brennan differed from Burger in emphasizing the importance
of meaningful communication in a system of self-government.
Brennan was more concerned with the effect of trial information
dissemination on democratic institutions, rather than on the pecu-
liarities of the criminal trial. Brennan thought that since civic re-
sponsibility and respect for the rule of law are fostered by open
trials 65 and since the first amendment is intended to ensure commu-
nications necessary for democracy,66 the first amendment creates a
presumptive right of access to trials. He found the history of open
trials so deeply ingrained in America's tradition that it is part of the
country's democratic fiber. Brennan did not distinguish between
civil and criminal trials.67 He admitted that some interests may re-
but the presumption of access, but he did not suggest what those
interests could be.68  Although both Brennan and Marshall dis-
sented in Gannett, Brennan did not comment on the correctness of
61. For further discussion of White's opinion, see text accompanying note 147 infra.
62. 438 U.S. 1, 19 (1978).
63. 448 U.S. at 583.
64. For further discussion of Stevens' opinion, see text accompanying notes 142-43
infra.
65. 448 U.S. at 587-88, 593-95.
66. Id at 587-88.
67. Id at 596.




Stewart also used his own first amendment analysis in his con-
currence in the judgment. He used a public forum analysis to con-
clude that a courtroom is more like a traditional public forum (such
as a street or park) than a non-public forum (such as a military base
or jail). Therefore, Stewart concluded, the government can only im-
pose reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions, rather than
impose an absolute prohibition on access.
Stewart's opinion differed from Burger's in that Stewart saw no
distinction between civil and criminal trials, and he incorporated
into his public forum analysis restrictions on the right to access.
Burger, on the other hand, discussed restrictions on the right to ac-
cess in a part of the opinion not dealing with the public forum anal-
ysis. 70 Stewart also differed from Burger in discussing the matter in
terms of a "freedom to listen ' 7I as opposed to Burger's discussion of
a "right of assembly."72 It is unclear whether this is a significant
distinction. Stewart did not mention any particular language in
Burger's opinion that prevented him from joining Burger's opinion.
Stewart's analysis differed from Stevens' in that Stewart emphasized
the place from which the information flows, rather than the type of
information flowing.73
Blackmun, who wrote the dissenting opinion in Gannett,
thought that Richmond Newspapers, like Gannett, should have been
a sixth amendment case. He conceded that the first amendment of-
fers more protection of public access to trials, but he did not develop
a first amendment analysis. In this way, Blackmun's opinion is like
White's one-paragraph concurrence joining Burger's plurality opin-
ion. Blackmun differs from White, however, by not joining any
other opinion. It is not clear whether Blackmun's belief in a first
amendment right of access is grounded in the reasons offered by
Burger (history of open criminal trials), Stevens (prohibition of state
interference with information dissemination), Brennan (importance
of trial communications to democratic institutions), or Stewart (right
to listen in a public forum). Furthermore, Blackmun considers the
first amendment justification as secondary to the sixth amendment,
69. For a comparison of Burger's and Brennan's opinions, see text accompanying note
118 infra.
70. 448 U.S. at 576-77.
71. Id. at 599 n.2.
72. Id. at 577.
73. For a comparison of Burger's and Stewart's opinions, see text accompanying notes
103 and 141 infra.
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even though Gannett rejected the latter.74
Rehnquist was the lone dissenter, refusing to find either a first
or sixth amendment right of access.
75
IV. ANALYSIS USED BY THE COURT
In order to employ Kurland-Bickel-Wechsler scrutiny on Rich-
mondNewspapers, the structure of the Burger opinion and the anal-
ysis Burger used to reach his conclusion will be examined. The first
sentence of Burger's opinion suggested he was not going to lay down
a broad principle which would have easy application to a different
set of facts. Implicitly rejecting the Wechsler notion that a case
should develop a principle with application beyond the strict hold-
ing,76 Burger stated, "The narrow question presented in this case is
whether the right of the public and press to attend criminal trials is
guaranteed under the United States Constitution.
77
After a brief review of the facts, Burger distinguished a case
which might have been expected to be dispositive in Richmond
Newspapers, the Gannett case. The first distinction from Gannett
which the Chief Justice raised was that Gannett involved a pretrial
hearing rather than the trial itself. He cited his own Gannett concur-
rence, even though it was not joined by any of the other Justices,
which emphasized that Gannett did not involve a trial. Burger did
not explain, either in Richmond Newspapers or in Gannett, why he
joined the opinion of the Court in Gannett notwithstanding that it
repeatedly referred to access to the trial itself.78 Nevertheless, Bur-
ger apparently found the pretrial status of Gannett to be the princi-
pal distinction. Later in the opinion, Burger distinguished Gannett
because it raised a sixth amendment issue.79 The Gannett Court as-
sumed that there is a first amendment right to attend trials, but
found the defendant's fair trial right had outweighed it. Burger then
proceeded to find the right to attend trials which Gannett had as-
sumed, arguendo, existed.
74. 448 U.S. at 603. For further discussion of Blackmun's opinion, see text accompany-
ing notes 144-48 infra.
75. 448 U.S. at 604. For further discussion of Rehnquist's opinion, see text accompany-
ing notes 104-05 M Ara.
76. See note 54 supra, See also Wechsler, supra note 8, at 19.
77. 448 U.S. at 558 (emphasis added).
78. Justice Blackmun noted in his Richmond Newspapers concurrence that the Gannett
Court opinion mentioned at least 12 times that the rule of the case applied to the trial itself.
Id at 601-02.
79. Id at 564.
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Burger found the first amendment right to attend trials by first
looking to the history of the criminal trial in the Anglo-American
judicial system. Going back to the time before the Norman Con-
quest, he found a tradition of the presumptive openness of trials.
Citing authorities like Blackstone and Wigmore, he stated that his-
tory forced him to conclude that "a presumption of openness in-
heres in the very nature of a criminal trial under our system of
justice."8 Justice Blackmun, who in concurrence criticized the
Chief Justice for his trial/pretrial distinction,"' praised him for his
use of history.82
Having found an historical basis for an open trial, Burger
looked to the Constitution for such a right. The first link between
the history and the Constitution is that the government's power to
limit information to the public is circumscribed by the first amend-
ment when that limitation arbitrarily denies information to which
the public historically has had access.8 3 Burger left unclear the type
of limitation of information which would trigger circumscription by
the first amendment and the extent of the circumscription.
The second link requires that an analogy be drawn between the
courtroom and a traditional public forum. Just as the rights of
speech, press, and assembly are subject to only narrow restrictions in
places of their traditional exercise, such as streets and parks, an his-
torically open courtroom is a place where the public has a right to be
subject only to those narrow restrictions.8 4
The next point Burger made is that even without being explic-
itly mentioned, there is a right to attend criminal trials implicit in
the first amendment. He suggested that this is one of the "funda-
mental rights. . . indispensable to the enjoyment of rights explicitly
defined. ' 85 Apparently he found this fundamental right in the his-
tory of the criminal trial. Blackmun noted in concurrence that the
plurality relied on "a cluster of penumbral guarantees" to find the
80. Id at 573.
81. See note 78 supra.
82. 448 U.S. at 601.
83. Id at 575-76. Compare this language to Stevens' concurrence while joining Burger:
"[T]he Court unequivocall holds that an arbitrary interference with access to important in-
formation is an abridgement of the freedoms of speech and of the press protected by the
First Amendment." Id at 583 (emphasis added). Stevens said "important" while Burger
emphasized historical access.
84. Id at 577-78. For the distinction between this part of the opinion and Stewart's
concurrence, see text accompanying notes 70-72 supra, and 103 and 141 infra.
85. 448 U.S. at 580.
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first amendment right.86
Burger concluded by applying the principle of a right to attend
trials to the facts of the case. Burger noted that in contrast to the
Gannett trial court, the Richmond Newspapers trial court did not rec-
ognize the right of public attendance. He further noted that there
was no consideration of alternatives. Burger added one sentence to
guide lower courts in weighing competing rights when the courts are
recognizing the public's right and considering alternatives: "Absent
an overriding interest articulated in findings, the trial of a criminal
case must be open to the public."87 Even this statement offered as
guidance leaves confusion. Earlier in the opinion Burger stated that
the issue to be determined was when "closure is required to protect
the defendant's superior right to a fair trial, or. . . some other over-
riding consideration. .. 88 It is unclear whether "overriding" in-
dicates that the opposing interest must be great, or is merely a
description of the type of interest which happens to outweigh the
public's right of attendance.
In summary, Burger's opinion emphasized the narrowness of
the issue, searched historical records to find a fundamental and con-
stitutional right necessary to preserve explicit constitutional rights,
applied the right to the facts, and concluded that since it had been
ignored it must have been violated. Little, if any, information is
given to indicate when the right will be violated if it is not ignored.
The opinion shows many of the faults which Kurland, Bickel, and
Wechsler found in Warren Court decisions. Some of these criti-
cisms are levelled by other Justices in their Richmond Newspapers
concurrences.
V. A KURLAND-BICKEL-WECHSLER CRITIQUE OF
RICHMOND NEWSPA PERS
Although the opinion of the Court in Richmond Newspapers
shows some improvement over the Warren Court by Kurland-
Bickel-Wechsler standards, many Warren Court characteristics re-
main. The opinions of the other Nixon-Ford appointees shed light
on their views of the Kurland-Bickel-Wechsler criticisms.
86. Id at 603.
87. Id at 581.




Among the criticisms which are easiest to analyze, Richmond
Newspapers shows improvement over the Warren Court.
On the issue of the use of amicus curiae briefs, it is difficult to
evaluate the Burger Court. In Richmond Newspapers eight amicus
briefs were filed.89 According to the rules of the Court, however, the
briefs could be submitted as a matter of right. The rules permit ami-
cus curiae briefs when all the parties consent, on order of the Court
when there is not consent,' or when submitted by the Solicitor Gen-
eral or a state.91 In Richmond Newspapers seven of the briefs were
submitted by consent of the parties, and the other was submitted by
New Jersey. Therefore, the large number of briefs was not the result
of discretion. However, those same rules existed verbatim for the
Warren Court,92 suggesting that this criticism of the Warren Court
may be unfair.
Another of the objective criticisms which is applicable to Rich-
mond Newspapers is the rendering of a decision of entirely prospec-
tive application. The Court was willing to hear a moot case because
of the nature of the complaint (trials would almost always be over
before the Supreme Court would decide a case) and the situation
would likely be repeated.93 Nevertheless, the decision had no effect
on the case before the Court. It is hard to fault the Court for taking
a case like Richmond Newspapers, however, since it was extremely
unlikely that the case would reach the High Court during a trial.
Not even the dissent faulted the Court on this point.
The Court can be faulted, however, for not producing a major-
ity opinion. The confusion caused by the many concurrences is dis-
cussed in section VI below. For present purposes, however, suffice it
to say that when the Court reaches out to decide a case that is argua-
bly nonjustifiable, and the reason for reaching out is that the case is
capable of repetition, the Court should produce a decision that
states the law on the subject matter. When no more than three Jus-
89. Three of the briefs were in support of the jurisdictional statement. One was submit-
ted by a conglomeration of journalism groups, a second by the American Civil Liberties
Union, and the third by the American Newspaper Editors. The other five went to the merits.
They were submitted by a group of fifty-six newspapers and three networks, the State of
New Jersey, and the three groups who submitted jurisdictional briefs. U.S. Supreme Court
Records and Briefs. Information Handling Services.
90. SuP. CT. R. 36.1, 28 U.S.C.A. (West Supp. 1981) (jurisdictional briefs); id at 36.2
(briefs on merits).
91. Id at 36.4.
92. See, e.g., SuP. CT. R. 42, 28 U.S.C. (1964).
93. 448 U.S. at 563.
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tices join an opinion, the case's future usefulness is severely limited,
if not destroyed. The future usefulness of the case is diminished
even further when the plurality emphasizes the narrow set of facts to
which the decision applies.94
The use of history by Burger is an improvement over the War-
ren Court. When Earl Warren could not find historical evidence
that the framers of the fourteenth amendment intended to prohibit
segregated schools, he called the historical record "inconclusive."95
Burger, on the other hand, presented a well-documented history of
the nature, purpose, and practice of criminal trials in the Anglo-
American judicial system. None of the other Justices, not even the
dissenter, challenged the accuracy of the historical record. Bren-
nan's concurrence emphasized different historical evidence, but that
is because Brennan saw the case as having implications beyond the
criminal trial setting. The harshest criticism of Burger's use of his-
tory is that it might not be relevant to a constitutional decision.
96
Another objective criticism is the failure of Court opinions to
respond to points raised by the dissent. Although this problem is
not present in Richmond Newspapers , a related problem does occur,
t e., failure to respond to concurrences. The dissent's criticism, that
the case takes power from the states because of the inclination of the
Justices, was addressed by the whole opinion as the Court attempted
to show the source of authority for the right-of-press-access cases in
nontrial settings. Stevens, who concurred and joined Burger's opin-
ion, suggested that the Court is embracing a philosophy of press ac-
cess which he and Justice Powell had espoused in dissent.97 The
Court had previously rejected a right of press access to prisons9" and
prisoners.99 Stevens said those cases implied that any governmental
restriction on access to information, no matter how severe or unjus-
tifed, is constitutional as long as the press is not treated worse than
94. Id at 558. The plurality opinion in Richmond Newspapers may be as narrow as
simply ordering that findings be put on the record. See text accompanying notes 130-32
infra.
95. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 489 (1954). Warren's historical analysis was
actually an exploration of why the record was unreliable, rather than a presentation of any
evidence to support affirmatively the decision of the Court. Id at 489-90.
96. See text accompanying notes 117-19 h.fra.
97. It is hard to believe that Justice Stevens really thought that that was what Burger
was doing, since Burger had written the plurality opinion in the case in which Stevens dis-
sented, Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978).
98. Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978).




the public at large. That clearly seemed to be the holding, at least as
related to prisons. Stevens contended that Richmond Newspapers
rejects this principle.' °° Burger's reference to these right of access
cases is simply to note that it does not matter whether Richmond
Newspapers deals with a "right of access" issue,' 0 ' and to distinguish
prisons from courtrooms. 102 He did not give us guidance, however,
about whether the right of access to trials is part of a general rule of
access to government information or is an exception to a general
rule of no right of access to government information. Additionally,
both Burger and Stewart can be faulted for not noting the distinc-
tion between their public forum analyses.1
0 3
A final objective criticism is the fostering of federal power at
the expense of the states. To some extent the issues involved in this
criticism, ite., whether the intrusion into state power is justified,
touch on the criticisms of the use of principles, and are further ex-
plained in Section V.B. below. It is appropriate to note, however,
that the decision in Richmond Newspapers seriously affects the exer-
cise of state power. This objection is one of the two main points of
Rehnquist's dissent. He referred to the diversity of the fifty states as
a "healthy pluralism."' ° He called "unhealthy" the degree of au-
thority exercised during the past generation by "a small group of
lawyers who have been appointed. . . and enjoy virtual life tenure"
and who are a "tiny numerical fragment of the 220 million people
who compose the population of this country."'' 0 5 Rehnquist also ob-
jected to the arbitrary balancing that will be needed to apply Rich-
mondNewspapers. Rehnquist's opinion juxtaposed the objection to
reducing state power with the objection to the arbitrary balancing
Richmond Newspapers calls for, suggesting that the promotion of
federal authority is justified only when there are clearly defined, ob-
jectively applicable constitutional provisions.
Burger was not reluctant to champion federal authority because
of a lack of explicit constitutional authority. In his argument that a
right to attend trials is fundamelital and implicit in the first amend-
ment, Burger cited eight cases in a footnote which increased federal
100. 448 U.S. at 582-83.
101. Id at 576. Burger also chose not to characterize Richmond Newspapers as a "right
to gather information" case, per Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (denying a first
amendment claim of reporters to withhold confidential sources from a grand jury).
102. 448 U.S. at 576 n.11.
103. See text accompanying notes 70-72 supra.




authority at the expense of the states; four of them are Warren
Court cases.' ° Burger apparently is not going to join the Kurland
camp on the federalism issue.
B. Criticisms of Principles
The other criticisms are more subjective and go to the constitu-
tional basis, precedential development, and future usefulness and
clarity of principles of constitutional adjudication. These criticisms
require a more thorough analysis of the opinions at hand and prior
opinions.
1. Constitutional Basis of the Princple
The first matter is to determine the source of the principle of
Richmond Newspapers. The principle as stated by Burger is that
there is a qualified right to attend criminal trials."7 Although he
called this right "implicit in the guarantees of the First Amend-
ment,"' 0 8 he also appeared to rely on the ninth amendment and, as
suggested by Blackmun, "penumbras."' 09 The word "penumbra" is
reminiscent of Justice Douglas' opinion in Griswold v. Connecti-
cut, 10 which relied on the penumbras of the third, fourth, fifth, and
ninth amendments to find a right of privacy."' Griswold was criti-
cized by Kurland for this approach because it lacked a constitu-
tional basis." 2 By citing Griswold and other cases to justify the
implied right to attend trials,"3 Burger seemed to be rejecting the
validity of the criticism of Griswold.
Burger rejected Virginia's contention that since the Constitu-
tion does not spell out a right to attend trials there is no such right.
He based the rejection on two factors. The first, expressed in a foot-
note, is that the ninth amendment was intended to allay the fear that
106. Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 483-86 (1978) (presumption of innocence); Estelle
v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976) (same); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (standard of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630 (1969) (right to
interstate travel); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (right to privacy); United States v.
Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757-59 (1966) (right to interstate travel); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965) (right to privacy); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958)
(right of association).
107. 448 U.S. at 580-81.
108. Id at 580.
109. Id at 603.
110. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
111. Id at 484.
112. P. KURLAND, POLmCS, supra note 9, at 93.
113. See cases cited note 106 supra.
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expressing certain guarantees in the Bill of Rights would be read as
excluding others." 4 The second factor is the practice of the Court in
acknowledging implied rights, such as those of association, privacy,
the presumption of innocence, and the right in a criminal trial to be
judged by a standard of proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.IlI
Burger called these rights "fundamental" as "indispensable to the
enjoyment of rights explicitly defined."" 6
By using these two factors, Burger has left unclear exactly how
he derived the right to attend trials. His exposition of the history
and policy behind the criminal trial would be relevant to a conclu-
sion that an open trial is one of the rights the framers forgot to in-
clude in the Bill of Rights, and is therefore included as one of the
rights "retained by the people.""' 7 Burger did not go that far, how-
ever, and he referred to the ninth amendment only in a footnote. It
would have been remarkable for Burger to rely on the ninth amend-
ment since the Supreme Court has not yet held that a particular
constitutional right flows solely from the ninth amendment.
Instead, Burger argued that the right of attendance is indispen-
sable to the enjoyment of explicit first amendment rights. He pro-
vided no basis for this conclusion, however. His use of the history of
trials is irrelevant to the first amendment. A history of how open
trials would promote freedom of speech or the press would be rele-
vant. Indeed, Brennan's concurrence looked at the historical record
of newsgathering and its role in a democratic society,"" and then
found open trials essential to the newsgathering interest.' 19 Burger,
on the other hand, offered evidence concerning why justice requires
open trials; his historical analysis did not demonstrate how speech
or press interests of the first amendment require openness. By fo-
cusing on justice, rather than on first amendment speech or press
interests, Burger's opinion does not appear to imply a right of press
access in out-of-court settings. Since Stevens argued that Richmond
Newspapers does have implications beyond courtrooms, this avoid-
ance of the relevance of other settings apparently was embraced
only by Burger and White. 20
Other Justices questioned the constitutional derivation of the
114. 448 U.S. at 579 n.15.
115. Id at 579; see cases cited note 106 supra.
116. 448 U.S. at 580.
117. U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
118. See text accompanying notes 65-69 supra.
119. 448 U.S. at 596-97.
120. Stevens nevertheless joined Burger's opinion.
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right to attend trials. Rehnquist rejected the idea that there is a right
of attendance in the first, sixth, or ninth amendments.' 2' Blackmun
called Burger's use of the "speech clause of the First Amendment,
the press clause, the assembly clause, the Ninth Amendment, and a
cluster of penumbral guarantees recognized in past decisions" a
"veritable potpourri." '22
In sum, Burger's derivation of his principle seems no different
from the practices of the Warren Court. He weighed policy matters
unrelated to the basis of his holding, e.g., the policy reasons behind
open trials for promoting a fair judicial system was the basis for a
right of access based on freedom of speech. Even if the policy argu-
ments were, like Brennan's, relevant to the Constitution, Burger
could still be criticized for finding a right simply because of its rela-
tionship to an explicit right. Implying such a right could have been
justified only if Burger had shown how closed trials would nega-
tively affect the flow of information under first amendment ideals.
2. Precedential Support for the Princple
When evaluating the Court's use of principle, its consistency
with prior cases, the principles of cases on which it relies, and the
cases which appear relevant but are not used must be examined.
Therefore, in Richmond Newspapers the determination of what Gan-
nett appeared to stand for in 1979 and what it stands for now is
important. Also, the effect of Richmond Newspapers on the
Houchins v. KQED, Inc. 123 line of cases dealing with press access in
out-of-court settings is relevant. Finally, the other cases cited in
Richmond Newspapers must be scrutinized. A search for a neutral
principle from the cases should be conducted before an evaluation
of the usefulness and clarity of the principle is made.
In a five to four opinion in Gannett, the Court had held that the
public has no sixth amendment right to attend a criminal pretrial
proceeding. At the end of the opinion the Court addressed the issue
whether there is a first amendment right to attend such a proceed-
ing. That portion of the opinion explained that the issue was
whether cases denying a right of press access-Houchins, Pell v.
Procunier,124 and Saxbe v. Washington Post Co. '25-should be him-
121. 448 U.S. at 605.
122. Id at 603.
123. 438 U.S. 1 (1978).
124. 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
125. 417 U.S. 843 (1974).
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ited to prisons. 126 The Gannett Court then avoided the issue by con-
cluding that balancing is appropriate and was conducted properly
by the trial court.
Gannett's strict holding is a negative holding, Le., there is not an
absolute right of the public or the Press to attend pretrial hearings.
The holding did not affirmatively state the existence of any first
amendment right. The Court actually referred to the issue in the
context of a criminal "trial;"'' 27 it did not suggest a difference in tri-
als as opposed to pretrial hearings. Burger's partial reliance on this
point to distinguish Gannett and Richmond Newspapers is not legiti-
mate. None of the other eight Justices joined in his concurrence on
this distinction. Furthermore, even Burger's concurrence appears to
go to the sixth amendment issue, not the first amendment issue.
Gannett begged the question decided by Richmond Newspapers.
It is surprising in retrospect how little guidance Gannett gave to
Richmond Newspapers. Both the Court and the dissent in Gannett
avoided deciding the issue of whether there is a first amendment
right to attend trials. Gannett was carefully worded to avoid a deci-
sion on the first amendment issue, leaving little with which Rich-
mond Newspapers could be inconsistent. Gannett deserves criticism
for avoiding an issue relevant to the case by skipping the underlying
issue-whether the right exists. 
28
Still, even when Gannett and Richmond Newspapers are read
together, they do not contribute much to understanding a clear prin-
ciple. Richmond Newspapers holds that there is a right to attend tri-
als which cannot be ignored. Gannett holds that under the facts of
its case the right was overcome. Worse, Burger wrote a history of
the criminal trial to show there is a cherished right to attend trials,
but he does not explain why that cherished right was overcome in
Gannett. Although the cases are not necessarily inconsistent, the
tone of Richmond Newspapers is one of promoting press access to
courtrooms, while the Gannett Court felt that two paragraphs were
enough to explain why a right of access was overridden.
29
Gannett said first amendment interests were overcome because
126. 443 U.S. at 391-92.
127. Id at 393.
128. For criticism of this avoidance, see Reznek, Gannett Co. v. DePasquale and Rich-
mond Newspapers v. Virginia: Re-opening Courtroom Doors and Constitutional Windows, 10
CAP. U. L. REv. 101, 113-14 (1980); Note, A Right ofAccess to a Criminal Courtroom. Gan-
nett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale, 51 U. COLO. L. REV. 425, 434 (1980).
129. 443 U.S. at 392-93.
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of a "reasonable probability of prejudice." 130 Richmond Newspapers
relied on the fact that no findings were made by the trial court. In
light of the fact that the transcript of the hearing to close the trial in
Richmond Newspapers shows that the trial judge believed that the
rights of the defendant would be infringed, 13' Burger must have
considered the element of a lack of findings crucial. If Richmond
Newspapers suggested a standard for trial closures more stringent
than a "reasonable probability of prejudice," it would be overruling
Gannett. The transcript makes it appear the trial judge in Richmond
Newspapers believed there was at least a reasonable probability of
prejudice. To keep the two cases consistent, the principle of Rich-
mond Newspapers would have to be that there is a right to attend
trials unless the trial court articulates a belief that there is either a
reasonable probability of prejudice to the defendant or some other
reason to close the trial. This is the result even though the tone of
Richmond Newspapers seems to be very protective of the press. 32 In
other words, Richmond Newspapers is consistent with Gannett only
when Richmond Newspapers is read for its narrowest possible hold-
ing-that findings are crucial.
An even more disturbing use of precedent by Burger was his
treatment of the right of access cases. Gannett recognized that
Houchins, Pell, and Saxbe were relevant to the right to attend tri-
als. 33 Burger distinguished the cases by noting that access to pris-
ons is generally limited. The access cases stood for the principle that
the government has no duty to allow the press access to gain infor-
mation. Indeed, Burger's opinion for the Court in Houchins said
that there is "no discernible basis for a constitutional duty to dis-
130. Id at 393.
131. The trial court stated: "[I]f I feel that the rights of the defendant are infringed in
any way, . . .and it doesn't completely override all rights of everyone else, then I'm in-
clined to go along with the defendant's motion [to close the trial]." 448 U.S. at 561 (quoting
transcript of Sept. 11, 1978, Hearing on Motion to Vacate, 20 (alterations by author)). The
trial court apparently believed the defendant's rights would actually be infringed in an open
trial and was not merely speculating that there was a "reasonable probability" of
infringement.
132. Newspapers immediately read Richmond Newspapers in such a press protective
fashion. The New York Times, for instance, suggested in an editorial that Richmond News-
papers had limited Gannett to only pretrial proceedings. N.Y. Times, July 3, 1980, § A, at
18, col. 1. A news article in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch said the decision permitted closed
trials only as a last resort and that Gannett applied only to pretrial settings. St. Louis Post-
Dispatch, July 2, 1980, § A, at 1, col. 1 (two star final ed.). For an explanation of why the
trial/pretrial difference is not the main point of distinction between Richmond Newspapers
and Gannett, see text accompanying notes 78 and 127 supra.
133. 433 U.S. at 391-92.
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close,"'1 34 and "this Court has never intimated a First Amendment
guarantee of a right of access to all sources of information within
government control."' 35 Burger did not say whether Houchins was
overly broad or Richmond Newspapers has applications beyond the
courtroom. Although Richmond Newspapers is consistent with the
Houchins holding, Burger did not explain the apparent inconsis-
tency with the dicta.
The Chief Justice's disposal of the press access cases is espe-
cially puzzling when it is examined in light of the cases on which he
relied to find the right of attendance. Although his citation of cases
dealing with trials is certainly appropriate, he also relied on a com-
mercial speech and a visas-for-Communists case. He cited First Na-
tional Bank v. Bellotti 136 for the proposition that the first
amendment "prohibit[s] government from limiting the stock of in-
formation from which the members of the public may draw."'
137
Bellotti, however, did not deal with information generated by the
government; it dealt with restrictions on communications made by a
private party. 13  Burger also cited Kleindienst v. Mandel' 39 for the
proposition that there is a right to receive information and ideas.14
Mandel seems inapposite in that it dealt with a federal statute deny-
ing visas to foreign Communists and the act was upheld. Even if
these cases were on point, one would expect Burger to reconcile
Houchins with these propositions.
Burger also used the public forum line of cases to support a
right of access to trials. 14 1 This was the concept on which Stewart
relied exclusively. Burger failed to relate this analysis to his "histor-
ical right of access" analysis.
In summary, Burger's use of precedent makes it difficult to di-
vine a neutrally applied principle. He ignored the implications in
the opinion most on point-Gannett (that some showing of
prejudice warrants closure). He relied on cases which were not on
point for broad statements of an absolute right to gather informa-
tion (Bellotti and Mandel), and then he distinguished cases which
134. 438 U.S. at 14.
135. Id at 9.
136. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
137. 448 U.S. at 576 (quoting Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 783).
138. Bellotti dealt with a challenge by a bank of a Massachusetts criminal statute which
prohibited certain expenditures by banks for the purpose of influencing the vote on referen-
dums. The Court found the statute unconstitutional.
139. 408 U.S. 753 (1972).
140. 448 U.S. at 576 (quoting Mandel, 408 U.S. at 762).
141. Id at 577-78.
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appear to be on point (Houchins, Pell, and Saxbe) and concluded by
pointing out that the right is qualified after all. It is hard to deter-
mine what principle Burger is even attempting to apply, so that
nothing more is left than the holding that a judge has to say why he
is closing a trial.
Stevens, who dissented in Houchins, thought that Richmond
Newspapers stands for a principle of access to government gener-
ally. 42 Nevertheless, he joined Burger's opinion. Stevens did not
explain why he joined Burger's opinion, but he must have realized
that Burger in Richmond Newspapers was not overruling Burger in
Houchins. Archibald Cox believes Stevens deliberately misstated
the breadth of Burger's opinion in an attempt to influence the future
course of the law in this area.
4 3
Blackmun is another post-Warren Court appointee whose opin-
ion is of questionable legitimacy. He concurred only in the judg-
ment, but stated he felt it was "obvious" the first amendment
interests of the public were abridged.' 44 His first amendment analy-
sis was very brief. It was limited to a statement that the public has a
need and right to know about the administration of justice.' 45 The
thrust of Blackmun's opinion was an expression of regret that the
sixth amendment was not made the basis for the access right, as he
had argued it should be in his dissent in Gannett. He considered the
first amendment analysis only a "secondary position."' 46
One can compare Blackmun's opinion to White's. White
agreed with Blackmun that Gannett was wrongly decided. How-
ever, he felt that in light of Gannett, the first amendment issue had
to be addressed, and he joined Burger's opinion on that issue.
147
Blackmun, on the other hand, refused to contribute to resolution of
the first amendment issue. His own analysis was superficial, and he
failed to join any of the three analyses offered for reversing the clo-
sure order. Blackmun is refusing to let the Gannett dissent die; he
said we must live with the first amendment analysis "at least for
now." 48 Blackmun could have contributed more to an understand-
142. Id at 583.
143. Cox, Foreword- Freedom of Expression in the Burger Court, 94 HARV. L. REv. 1, 25
(1980).
144. 448 U.S. at 604.
145. Id
146. Id
147. Id at 581-82.
148. Id at 603.
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ing of the law of trial closure by joining either Burger, Brennan, or
Stewart, thereby making the Court's decision slightly less splintered.
3. Future Usefulness of the Principle
As might be surmised by the discussion of the application of the
principle used in Richmond Newspapers, the principle of the case is
not very helpful for future application.
In order to reconcile Richmond Newspapers and Gannett, Rich-
mond Newspapers must be read narrowly. Gannett held that a rea-
sonable probability of closure, a failure by reporters to object, and
availability of a transcript later justified closing a trial. In Richmond
Newspapers the last two factors were present, and a transcript of the
closure hearing showed the trial court's belief that the defendant's
right would be infringed by an open trial.'49 The Court was simply
ordering findings on the record, but without offering any guidance
to lower courts on how to balance the public's versus the defendant's
rights. Lower courts will have a difficult time developing a consis-
tent body of law.
Lower courts are already having difficulty. In a case from the
Eighth Circuit, that court said closure would be allowed only when
"strictly and inescapably necessary in order to protect the fair trial
guarantee"' 50 in cases in which the prosecution opposes closure. A
concurring opinion from that circuit, in a post-Richmond Newspa-
pers case, argued for expansion of that standard to all closure
orders.1
5 1
Although it seems hard to believe, the Burger Court reached
out for a moot case to produce a plurality decision that was so nar-
row it added no principle to the law of trial closures other than that
a trial judge has to say why he is closing the trial. Even this narrow,
almost useless, 52 principle cannot command a majority on the
Court. The question may be asked why the Justices bothered.
VI. ADDITIONAL CRITICISM
When Richmond Newspapers is subjected to the scrutiny exer-
149. See note 131 supra.
150. United States v. Powers, 622 F.2d 317, 322 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 837
(1980) (court's emphasis).
151. In In re United States ex rel Pulitzer Publishing Co., 635 F.2d 676, 679-80 (8th Cir.
1980) (Gibson, J., concurring), the court overturned a voir dire closure order.
152. This narrow principle has had, nevertheless, at least one application. The Eighth
Circuit reversed an order of the trial court to close voir dire because the trial court had failed
to articulate for the record reasons for the closure order. Id at 678.
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cised by Kurland, Bickel, and Wechsler, the Burger Court looks lit-
tle better than the Warren Court. Nevertheless, Richmond
Newspapers shows a problem with the Burger Court that was not
among the criticisms of the Warren Court: the practice of the pres-
ent Justices to produce individual opinions. The seven Justices who
favored reversal in Richmond Newspapers produced six opinions
and no majority.
Burger's opinion does little to assist lower courts in applying
Richmond Newspapers. The lack of a majority makes it even more
difficult. Stevens, for instance, suggested that Richmond Newspapers
will have relevance in out-of-court settings. The opinion of Bren-
nan, joined by Marshall, used an analysis that could be applied to
out-of-court settings. The contribution of these concurrences to the
development of the law is unclear because none of those three Jus-
tices were with a majority in the non-press-protective prison access
cases.
White and Blackmun concurred to express their belief that the
sixth amendment right is dispositive. They concurred in the use of
the first amendment because they had to do so to achieve the desired
result. Blackmun appears ready to abandon Gannett if the opportu-
nity arises. These two concurrences will not contribute to the devel-
opment of the law since the Court has already rejected the sixth
amendment argument advanced in Gannett.
Justice Stewart emphasized that there are limits on the right of
attendance, but he did not define them. He, too, could have contrib-
uted more to the development of the law by joining one of the other
opinions. Instead, he leaves lawyers to ponder the exact basis for his
inability to join Burger's public forum analysis as they try to predict
how he will decide future cases.
Stewart and Blackmun did not write opinions which had
unique, comprehensive analyses of the law of trial closures. Had
they joined one of the two opinions that were distinct in analysis-
Burger's or Brennan's-there would have been an opinion with at
least four Justices and perhaps a majority. Even a four-person plu-
rality would have been helpful since Justice Powell, who did not
participate, could make a majority in the next case.
53
The proclivity toward producing concurring opinions is not a
problem confined to Richmond Newspapers under the Burger
153. Powell's lack of participation could be another reason why the Court should not
have reached out for a moot case.
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Court.15 4 The Burger Court has produced more plurality opinions
than have been produced in the entire prior history of the Court and
more than twice as many plurality opinions as the Warren Court.
55
Plurality opinions require a change in traditional case analysis. In-
stead of looking for the holding of a case, one must use a scorecard
to predict, based on concurrences, how each Justice will decide a
case which is slightly different from the studied case. Besides the
difficulty of predicting accurately, this practice deinstitutionalizes
the law. It promotes disrespect for the Supreme Court by emphasiz-
ing that there is not a clear concept of the law that nine wise men
can grasp, but instead varies from Justice to Justice according to his
personal perspective.
56
A plurality opinion, especially one with as many concurrences
as Richmond Newspapers, does nothing more toward explaining the
law than would a summary affirmance or reversal or a per curiam
opinion. A plurality opinion, like a summary opinion, has future
application only to an identical set of facts. Kurland, Bickel, and
Wechsler criticized the Warren Court for per curiam decisions,
157
but the Burger Court's concurrences are just as great an impediment
to constitutional adjudication.'
154. Archibald Cox calls the use of concurrences a characteristic of the present Court.
Cox, supra note 143, at 24.
155. The Burger Court had produced 88 plurality decisions through the 1979 term. The
Warren Court produced 42. All previous Courts produced a total of 45. Note, Pluralily
Decisions and Judicial Decisionmaking, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1127, 1127 n. 1 (1981).
156. The supreme court of at least one state has recently expressed this sentiment of
seeing United States Supreme Court decisions as subjective opinions of individuals. In a
disbarment proceeding the attorney-respondent asked the Missouri Supreme Court to follow
the four part test of Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S.
557 (1980), to determine if Missouri rules restricting attorney advertising were constitu-
tional. The Missouri Supreme Court stated:
We are urged now by respondent to follow the CentralHudson model. We respect-
fully decline to enter the thicket of attempting to anticipate and to satisfy the sub-
jective adhoc judgments of a majority of the justices of the United States Supreme
Court. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 89 S. Ct. 1322, 22 L. Ed. 2d 600
(1969) (the compelling state interest test); and Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 100
S. Ct. 1759, 64 L. Ed. 2d (1980) (the imposition of the death penalty).
In re R.M.J., 609 S.W.2d 411, 412 (Mo. 1981), rev'd, 102 S. Ct. 929 (1982). The Missouri
court also delivered a more subtle insult. Rather than describing the four part test of Central
Hudson with a quote from that case, the court quoted a National Law Journal article in-
stead. 609 S.W.2d at 412. The quote from the article did not provide a special insight. It
merely tracked the language of the opinion.
157. See text accompanying notes 42-50 supra.
158. Wechsler may have felt otherwise. Commenting on the obscenity per curiam deci-
sions, he stated:
I realize that nine men often find it easier to reach agreement on result than upon
reasons and that such a difficulty may be posed within this field. Is it not prefera-
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VII. CONCLUSION
The Warren Court was criticized for its departure from what
one of its defenders, Judge Skelly Wright, calls the "scholarly tradi-
tion." 59 Writers such as Kurland, Bickel, and Wechsler criticized
the Warren Court for unprincipled, result-oriented decisions. Rich-
mondNewspapers shows that the criticisms of the Warren Court are
applicable to the Burger Court. The decision cursorily explained
the derivation of the constitutional right to attend trials, misused
precedent, failed to develop a principle of law for neutral applica-
tion, and failed to provide guidance to lower courts when reaching
the holding of the case. The Court reached out for a moot case to
produce multiple opinions without a majority view, with even the
plurality being too narrow to be helpful. Furthermore, the Court,
even in a narrow decision like Richmond Newspapers, continues to
fail to reach consensus, causing more confusion in the law and disre-
spect for the Supreme Court as an institution.
Kurland concluded his Warren Court critique with a challenge
to the next Court: "The Nixon Court has awesome tasks before it:
to match the Warren Court attainments in the protection of individ-
uals and minorities that today justifies the Court's existence; to re-
store the confidence of the American public in the rule of law. One
or the other is not enough."' 160 Evaluation of the Court's record on
the first point is left to others. With regard to restoring confidence
in the law, according to the standards used by Warren Court critics,
Richmond Newspapers indicates the Burger Court has failed.
ble, however, indeed essential, that if this is so the variations of position be
disclosed?
Wechsler, supra note 8, at 21.
159. Wright, supra note 9.
160. P. KuaL AD, POLmCS, supra note 9, at 206.
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